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The Committee thought carefully about Barclays’ remuneration philosophy during 2015, and we agreed a revised, simplified statement, which articulates Barclays’ overarching approach to remuneration.

The Committee’s priorities are to ensure that Barclays pays for sustainable performance, aligns remuneration with risk and delivers a greater proportion of the income we generate to our shareholders.


  • The Committee’s 2015 pay decisions took full consideration of financial performance, both on an adjusted and a statutory basis, and non-financial performance including progress towards the 2018 targets within the Balanced Scorecard. The Committee also recognised the need to improve returns to shareholders and to accelerate delivery. We are committed to moving this forward in a manner that is consistent with Barclays’ Values to ensure that legacy events are not repeated.

    Although there were improvements in the Core operating businesses with Core adjusted profit before tax up 3%, Group adjusted profit before tax was down 2% to £5,403m for 2015. Group statutory profit before tax was down 8% at £2,073m. The Group’s capital position has continued to strengthen with a CRD IV fully loaded Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 11.4% and a leverage ratio of 4.5% at the end of the year. Cost targets have been met and Barclays Non-Core has made significant progress in reducing its risk weighted assets.

    Against this background, the Group incentive pool for 2015 is again significantly lower than in prior years, down by £191m or 10% in absolute terms at £1,669m compared to the incentive pool of £1,860m for 2014. Similarly, the 2015 Investment Bank incentive pool is down 7%, despite the Investment Bank’s adjusted profit before tax increasing by 17%.

    Total compensation costs are down 6%, and the compensation to adjusted net income ratio is 37.2%, down from 37.7% in 2014. The Core compensation to adjusted net income ratio is also down at 34.7% (2014: 35.7%).

  • A central feature of our remuneration philosophy is that remuneration must be aligned with risk, and with the conduct expectations of Barclays, our regulators and stakeholders. The Group incentive pool outlined above is after adjustments the Committee has made for both risk and conduct events. In addition to specific risk and conduct events, we also adjusted the incentive pool to take account of an overall assessment of a wide range of future risks, non-financial factors that can support the delivery of a strong conduct culture and other factors including reputation, impact on customers, markets and other stakeholders.

    We have a robust process for considering risk and conduct issues as part of individual performance management reviews with outcomes reflected in individual incentive decisions. Individuals who are directly or indirectly accountable for risk and conduct events have had their remuneration adjusted as appropriate. This includes reductions in current year bonus levels and reductions in vesting amounts of deferred awards through the application of malus.

  • 2015 saw a change in Group Chief Executive. All of the associated remuneration decisions were made in accordance with the Directors’ remuneration policy approved by our shareholders at the 2014 Annual General Meeting (AGM).

    We announced on 28 October 2015 that Jes Staley was to become Group Chief Executive with effect from 1 December 2015. He was appointed on a salary of £1,200,000 and Role Based Pay of £1,150,000 commensurate with market pay levels. He was not eligible for a 2015 bonus or a grant under the 2016-2018 long term incentive plan (LTIP) cycle. The Committee approved the grant of a share buy-out award to compensate him for an unvested share award granted to him by a previous employer which was forfeited as a result of him joining Barclays. The award was made on terms aligned to the forfeited award. Jes Staley satisfied, at the date of joining, the executive Directors’ shareholding requirement of four times salary through his personal purchase of 2,790,000 Barclays shares.

    During the four month period between Antony Jenkins’ departure as Group Chief Executive and Jes Staley starting in the role, John McFarlane served as Executive Chairman. He indicated to the Committee that he did not wish his remuneration to be increased during that time, and therefore his fee remained unchanged for the period during which he served as Executive Chairman.

    The Committee also approved compensation arrangements on Antony Jenkins’ departure as Group Chief Executive during the year. 

    Bonuses for both of the executive Directors in role at the start of 2015 were determined against the financial, Balanced Scorecard and personal measures set at the beginning of the year. The Committee approved a pro-rated 2015 bonus award of £505,000 for Antony Jenkins. A 2015 bonus award of £701,000 was approved for Tushar Morzaria. Tushar Morzaria took on significantly increased executive responsibilities in the second half of 2015 and we regard this bonus as fully deserved in recognition of his strong performance.

    During the year, we also reviewed the performance measures of our LTIP to ensure they are appropriate given our strategy and align the interests of executive Directors and shareholders. We have changed the financial measures and given them an increased weighting of 70% for the award to be granted in 2016 and added a comprehensive Risk Scorecard as the new risk measure which will focus on Barclays’ management of principal risks (including Conduct Risk). Before formal approval, we engaged with shareholders on these changes. Tushar Morzaria is the only participant in this LTIP cycle. 

  • The volume and pace of regulatory change has continued during 2015. 

    The PRA made revisions to the Remuneration part of its Rulebook (formerly the UK Remuneration Code) which apply from 1 January 2016. These include the seven, five and three year ‘tiered’ deferral requirements for Senior Managers and different categories of Material Risk Taker (MRT) respectively, and the potential extension of the clawback period to 10 years for Senior Managers (under certain circumstances). These changes, which apply globally to Barclays as a UK-headquartered bank, further emphasise the competitive disadvantages attributable to the lack of a global level regulatory ‘playing field’.

    Further revisions to the Remuneration part of the PRA Rulebook are expected during 2016 as a consequence of the European Banking Authority’s (EBA) final Guidelines on sound remuneration policies. The most significant changes include a prohibition on the payment of dividends on deferred shares and an increase to a one year (from six months) holding period for incentive awards delivered in shares to the large majority of MRTs. The Guidelines apply from 1 January 2017. The application of the Guidelines to UK firms, once confirmed by the PRA and FCA, will contribute to changes to our Directors’ remuneration policy in 2017.

Agenda for 2016

In line with legal requirements, we will be seeking shareholder approval for our Directors’ remuneration policy at the 2017 AGM. As a Committee, we will review our remuneration policy to ensure that future arrangements are fully aligned to our strategy to accelerate delivery to shareholders in a manner consistent with Barclays’ Values  and also to meet new regulatory requirements. This will be developed over the coming months and we will engage constructively with shareholders and regulators as we do so.

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Corporate strategy and priorities

Our strategy remains on course to build a stronger, fitter, better bank. Barclays has been repositioned, simplified and rebalanced to generate sustainable returns.

03 Mar 2014, 09:11 GMT

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